There are other pieces of legislation that, while not directly affecting the ability of the United States to engage with the Court, are nevertheless relevant for a general understanding of the framework in which policy toward engagement with the Court is made, including laws sharpening the United States' commitment to preventing and responding to atrocity crimes and to supporting accountability when international crimes are committed. These include the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocity Prevention Act, ⁶⁰ the Global Fragility Act, ⁶¹ the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017; ⁶² the Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act of 2017; ⁶³ and the Iraq & Syria Genocide Accountability Act of 2018. ⁶⁴ The ICC is an important player in many of the states that are affected by these pieces of legislation. For example, the initial Executive Branch reports under the Elie Wiesel Act highlight U.S. support for documentation and accountability of atrocities in Burma (Myanmar), which are subject to an ICC investigation. ⁶⁵ To the extent that existing or future legislation requires reporting on, or appropriates resources to support, documentation and accountability efforts, there will be additional overlap with the activities of the ICC.

The United States also maintains a range of programs that impose sanctions on individuals, both country-specific regimes and those addressed to particular types of deleterious conduct, including global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), drug trafficking, and serious human rights abuses or corruption (exemplified by the Global Magnitsky Act sanctions regime). ⁶⁶ The intersection of these authorities and the activities of the Court is not theoretical: the United States currently has country-specific sanctions regimes covering eight situations in which the ICC is investigating or conducting a preliminary examination; ⁶⁷ and has imposed sanctions against at least thirteen individuals who the ICC had charged with international crimes (six of whom remain at large). ⁶⁸